Cognitive heuristics for commonsense reasoning in the next generation of AI systems



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tarmac at an airport

Figure 6: Perceiving scenes without intuitive physics, intuitive psychology, compositionality, and causality. Image captions are generated by a deep neural network (Karpathy & Fei-Fei, 2015) using code from github.com/karpathy/neuraltalk2. Image credits: Gabriel Villena Fernández (left), TVBS Taiwan / Agence France-Presse (middle) and AP Photo / Dave Martin (right). Similar examples using images from Reuters news can be found at twitter.com/interesting_jpg.

dirt road

Lake et al. 2017

top of a beach

SYSTEM PROMPT (HUMAN-WRITTEN)

In a shocking finding, scientist discovered a herd of unicorns living in a remote, previously unexplored valley, in the Andes Mountains. Even more surprising to the researchers was the fact that the unicorns spoke perfect English.

MODEL COMPLETION (MACHINE-WRITTEN, 10 TRIES) The scientist named the population, after their distinctive horn, Ovid's Unicorn. These four-horned, silver-white unicorns were previously unknown to science.

Now, after almost two centuries, the mystery of what sparked this odd phenomenon is finally solved.

Dr. Jorge Pérez, an evolutionary biologist from the University of La Paz, and several companions, were exploring the Andes Mountains when they found a small valley, with no other animals or humans. Pérez noticed that the valley had what appeared to be a natural fountain, surrounded by two peaks of rock and silver snow.

Pérez and the others then ventured further into the valley. "By the time we reached the top of one peak, the water looked blue, with some crystals on top," said Pérez.

Pérez and his friends were astonished to see the unicorn herd. These creatures could be seen from the air without having to move too much to see them — they were so close they could touch their horns.

While examining these bizarre creatures the scientists discovered that the creatures also spoke some fairly regular English. Pérez stated, "We can see, for example, that they have a common 'language,' something like a dialect or dialectic."

Dr. Pérez believes that the unicorns may have originated in Argentina, where the animals were believed to be descendants of a lost race of people who lived there before the arrival of humans in those parts of South America.

https://opena


B

GPT-3/Problems

- Text completion is a prediction test, not a test of compositionality
- Lack of commonsense reasoning

You are having a small dinner party. You want to serve dinner in the living room. The dining room table is wider than the doorway, so to get it into the living room, you will have to **remove the door. You have a table saw, so you cut the door in half and remove the top half.**

from https://cs.nyu.edu/~davise/papers/GPT3CompleteTests.html



Commonsense knowledge as grounding element of layers of growing thinking capabilities



Commonsense knowledge and reasoning capabilities

Al and CogSci Approaches to Commonsense Reasoning (partial overview)

Cognitive Heuristics

Machine-oriented Heuristics



Fuzzy Logic Zadeh, 1966

Frames (Minsky, 1975)



Scripts (Shank & Abelson,

1977)

(Gärdenfors, 2000) Circumscription (Mc Carthy, 1980,86)





Conceptual Spaces



(1962)






Default Logic Reiter (1980)



Qualitative Repres. (Forbus, 1984)

Cognitive AI/Computational CogSci




Functionalist vs Structuralist Models



Same *input-out* spec. and surface resemblance of the internal components and of their working mechanisms between artificial and natural system



Same *input-out* spec. + constrained *resemblance* of the internal components and of their working mechanisms between artificial and natural system





Cognitive Design for Artificial Minds

Antonio Lieto



Lieto, 2021, Cognitive Design for Artificial Minds, Routledge (Taylor & Francis, UK).

Commonsense reasoning

Concerns all the type of non deductive (or non monotonic) inference:

- induction
- abduction
- default reasoning


- ...

Commonsense reasoning

Concerns all the type of non deductive (or non monotonic) inference:

- induction
- abduction
- default reasoning

- ...



Compositionality

- **COMPOSITIONALITY** is an irrevocable trait of human cognition (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 88).

- A crucial generative requirement



Commonsense Compositionality

PET FISH Problem: **Prototypes are not compositional** (Osherson and Smith, 1981).


Fish = {Greyish, Lives-in Water, not Warm.. }



PET = {hasFur, Warm, not Lives-in Water... }


The resulting PET FISH concept is not merely composed by the additive inclusion of the typical features of the two composing concepts (i.e. PET and FISH).

Levels of Representations




Lieto, Chella, Frixione, 2017. Conceptual Spaces for Cognitive Architectures: A Lingua Franca for Different Levels of Representations, Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures.

Levels of Representations




Levels of Representations



Typicality


Prototypes and Prototypical Reasoning

- Categories based on prototypes (Rosh, 1975)
- New items are compared to the prototype



Exemplars and Exemplar-based Reasoning

 Categories as composed by a list of exemplars. New percepts are compared to known exemplars (not to Prototypes).



Conflicting Theories?

- Exemplars theory overcomes the Prototypes (it can explain so called OLD ITEM EFFECT).
- Still in some situations **prototypes** are preferred in categorization tasks.

Prototypes, Exemplars and other conceptual representations (for the same concept) can co-exists and be activated in different contexts (Malt 1989).

DUAL PECCS: DUAL- Prototype and Exemplars Conceptual Categorization System

Lieto, Radicioni, Rho (IJCAI 2015, JETAI 2017)

2 Cognitive Assumptions




- 1) Multiple representations for the same concept
- 2) On such diverse, but connected, representation are executed different types of reasoning (System 1/ System 2) to integrate.

Type 1 Processes	Type 2 Processes
Automatic	Controllable
Parallel, Fast	Sequential, Slow
Pragmatic/contextualized	Logical/Abstract


Heterogeneous Proxytypes Hypothesis

The diverse **types of connected representations** can coexist and point to the same conceptual entity. Each representation can be activated as a **proxy** (for the entire concept) from the long term memory to the working memory of a cognitive agent.




(Lieto, A. A Computational Framework for Concept Representation in Cognitive Systems and Architectures: Concepts as Heterogeneous Proxytypes, Proc. of BICA 2014)

Ex. Heterogeneous Proxytypes at work




Co-referring representational Structures via Wordnet



Lieto, A., Radicioni, D. P., & Rho, V. (2017). **Dual PECCS: a cognitive system for conceptual representation and categorization**. Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 29(2), 433-452.

Co-referring representational Structures via Wordnet



Lieto, A., Mensa, E., Radicioni, D., 2016. A resource-driven approach for anchoring linguistic resources conceptual spaces. In Conference of the Italian Association for Artificial Intelligence (pp. 435-449). Springer, Cham.

S1/S2 Categorization Algorithms

6

8 end

```
Result: A class assignment, as computed by S1 and S2
1 trialCounter \leftarrow 0;
2 \ closed^{S1} = \{\emptyset\}
3 while trialCounter < maxTrials do
       // conceptual spaces output
       c \leftarrow S1(d, closed^{S1});
       if trialCounter == 0 then c^* \leftarrow c:
       // ontology based consistency chec
       cc \leftarrow S2(d, conceptPointedBy(c));
       if cc equals(conceptPointedBy(c)) then
           return \langle c^*, cc \rangle;
       else
           closed^{S1} add(conceptPointedBy(c))
       end
11
       ++trialCounter;
13 end
14 cc \leftarrow S2(\langle d, \mathsf{Thing} \rangle);
15 return (c*, cc);
      Algorithm 1: The S1-S2 categorization process.
```


Data: Linguistic d



Data: Linguistic description: d; list of inconsistent concepts: $closed^{S1}$. **Result**: A typicality based representation of a category. 1 $S1_{EX} \leftarrow categorizeExemplars(d)$; 2 if firstOf(S1_{EX}, closed^{S1}).distance(d) <</p> similarityThreshold then return first $Of(S1_{EX}, closed^{S1})$; 4 else $S1_{PR} \leftarrow categorizePrototypes(d);$ // in case of equal distance prefer exemplars $typicalityCategorization \leftarrow sortResults(S1_{EX}, S1_{PR});$ **return** first $Of(typicalityCategorization, closed^{S1});$


Algorithm 2: S1 categorization with prototypes and exem plars implementing the instruction in Algorithm 1: line 4.

Overview





https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1KtnAWyxj-8



Cognitive Architectures



A cognitive architecture (Newell, 1990) implements the invariant structure of the cognitive system.

The work on such systems started in the '80s (SOAR (Newell, Laird and Rosenbloom, 1982)

It captures the underlying **commonality** between different intelligent agents and provides a **framework** from which intelligent behavior arises.

The architectural approach emphasizes the role of memory in the cognitive process.

Allen Newell (1990) Unified Theory of Cognition

ACT-R, SOAR, CLARION and LIDA Extended Declarative Memories with DUAL-PECCS




Fig. 3. General overview of the DUAL-PECCS integration within different cognitive architectures.

http://dualpeccs.di.unito.it

i www.dualpeccs.di.unito.it/index.html





Q Cerca

Dual-PECCS

HOMEPAGE

PAPERS

DOWNLOAD

CONTRIBUTORS

Evaluation

Gold standard of 112 common sense linguistic descriptions provided by a team of linguists, philosophers and neuroscientists interested in the neural basis of lexical processing (FMRI) and tested on **45 humans**.

For each description recorded the **human answers** for the categorization task.

Stimulus	Expected Concept	Expected Proxy- Representation	Type of Proxy- Representation
		•••	•••
The primate with red nose	Monkey	Mandrill	EX
The feline with black fur that hunts mice	Cat	Black cat	EX
The big feline with yellow fur	Tiger	Prototypical Tiger	PR

Evaluation Accuracy Metrics

- Two evaluation metrics have been devised:
 - Concept Categorization Accuracy: estimating how often the correct concept has been retrieved;
 - Proxyfication Accuracy: how often the correct concept has been retrieved AND the expected representation has been retrieved, as well.

test	CC-ACC	P-ACC
with no IE	89.3% (100/112)	79.0% (79/100)
with IE	$77.7\% \ (87/112)$	$71.3\% \ (62/87)$

Proxyfication Error

test	Proxyfication error		
test	Ex-Proto	Proto-Ex	Ex-Ex
with no IE	21.0% (21/100)	0.0% (0/100)	0.0% (0/100)
with IE	28.8% (26/87)	0.0%~(0/87)	$5.8\% \ (5/87)$

- Three sorts of proxyfication errors were committed:
 - Ex-Proto, an exemplar is returned in place of a prototype;
 - Proto-Ex, we expected a prototype, but a prototype is returned;
 - *Ex-Ex*, an exemplar is returned differing from the expected one.

Analysis

- The comparison of the obtained results with human categorization is encouraging **77-89%** (results of other AI systems for such reasoning tasks are by far lower).
- The analysis of the results revealed that it is not true that exemplars (if similar enough to the stimulus to categorize) are always preferred w.r.t. the prototypes.
- Need of a more fine-grained theory explaining more in the details the interaction between co-existing representations in the heterogeneous hypothesis.

Theory-theory

Concepts themselves are identified with micro-theories of some sort.

- The use of micro-theories is important for categorization
- Keil experiment (1989): subjects were asked to make categorization judgments about the biological membership of an animal that had undergone unusual transformations (moving it from typical to atypical) => People confirms original categoriz.

Micro-theories are common-sense "relational" knowledge networks about a given concept. They lead to common-sense inferences.

Ex.: we typically associate to a **light switch** the **knowledge** that **IF** we turn it "on" **THEN** the light will be provided (common-sense inf.).

Heterogeneous Proxytypes Extended: Integrating Theory-like Representations and Mechanisms with Prototypes and Exemplars

Antonio Lieto

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DELTA: unifie**D** CatEgorization aLgorithm for heTerogeneous representAtions


```
Data: Stimulus d; list of candidate representations: closed^{S1}.
   Result: A typicality based representation of a category.
 1 closed^{S1} = \{\emptyset\}
 2 S1_{EX} \leftarrow categorizeExemplars(d);
 3 if firstOf(S1_{EX}, closed^{S1}).distance(d) < similarityThreshold then
     return firstOf(S1_{EX}, closed^{S1});
 5 else
   S1_{PR} \leftarrow categorizePrototypes(d) \text{ return } firstOf(S1_{PR}, closed^{S1});
 7 end
 8 if firstOf(S1_{PR}, closed^{S1}).distance(d) > ConceptualCoherenceThreshold then
    return firstOf(S1_{PR}, closed^{S1});
10 else
       S1_{\mathsf{T}} \leftarrow categorizeTheory(d);
       return firstOf(TheoryBasedCategorization, closed^{S1});
13 end
```

Algorithm 1: A Unified categorization algorithm for prototypes, exemplars and theory-like representations.

Stimulus (golden zebra)



1) Exemplar-based categorization



Stimulus (golden zebra)



1) Exemplar-based categorization

No exemplar

LTM Concept (X) Has component Has component Prototype (X) Exemplar (X) Theory (X) horse "theory" white horse (Prototype)


Stimulus (golden zebra)



1) Exemplar-based categorization

No exemplar

2) Prototype-based categorisation



Stimulus (golden zebra)




1) Exemplar-based categorization

No exemplar

2) Prototype-based categorisation

white horse



Stimulus (golden zebra)




1) Exemplar-based categorization


No exemplar

2) Prototype-based categorisation

white horse

3) Conceptual Coherence Check of the Prototype (w.r.t. the Stimulus).





horse "theory"

Stimulus (golden zebra)



1) Exemplar-based categorization


No exemplar

2) Prototype-based categorisation

white horse

3) Conceptual Coherence Check of the Prototype (w.r.t. the Stimulus).

LTM



E.g. the stimulus "lives in the Savannah" (and this contrasts with our "theory" about horses). Thus the prototypical answer can be overridden (as in the Klein cases)

Commonsense Compositionality

TCL

A non monotonic Description Logic of typicality (T^{CL}), for typicality-based concept combination based on 3 ingredients

- Description Logics with Typicality (ALC + T)
- Probabilities and Distributed Semantics (Disponte)
- Heuristics from Cognitive Semantics (HEAD-MODIFER)

Lieto & Pozzato, "A Description Logic Framework for Commonsense Conceptual Combination Integrating Typicality, Probabilities and Cognitive Heuristics", in Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 32 (5), 769-804, 2020. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.02366.pdf

Typicality + Distributed Semantics

We extended the **ALC+T** Logic with **typicality inclusions equipped by real numbers** representing probabilities/degrees of belief.

We adopted the **DISPONTE semantics** (Riguzzi et al 2015) restricted to typicality inclusions:

extension of ALC by inclusions **p** :: **T** (**C**) □ **D**

epistemic interpretation: "we believe p that typical Cs are Ds"

The result of this integration allowed us to reason on typical probabilistic scenarios

Cognitive Heuristics

Heuristics from **cognitive semantics** for the identification of plausible mechanisms for blocking-inheritance.

HEAD-MODIFIER heuristics (Hampton, 2011):

- HEAD: stronger element of the combination
- MODIFIER weaker element

where C

□ CH

□ CM

The compound concept C as the combination of the HEAD (CH) and the MODIFIER (CM)

Selection Criteria

The typical properties of the form $T(C) \sqsubseteq D$ to ascribe to the concept C are obtained in the set of scenarios, obtained by applying the DISPONTE semantics, that are:

- consistent with respect to KB;
- not trivial, e.g. those ascribing all properties of the HEAD are discarded;
- giving preference to CH w.r.t. CM with the highest probability

Pet Fish

- Fish
 □ ∀livesIn.Water
- 0.9 :: $T(Pet) \sqsubseteq \forall livesIn.(\neg Water)$
- 0.8 :: $T(Pet) \sqsubseteq Affectionate$
- 0.7 :: $T(Fish) \sqsubseteq \neg Affectionate$
- 0.8 :: $\mathbf{T}(Pet) \sqsubseteq Warm$
- 0.6 :: $T(Fish) \sqsubseteq Greyish$
- 0.9 :: $T(Fish) \sqsubseteq Scaly$
- 0.8 :: $T(Fish) \sqsubseteq \neg Warm$

Pet Fish - Different scenarios

- 0.9 :: $\mathbf{T}(Pet) \sqsubseteq \forall livesIn.(\neg Water)$
- 0.8 :: $T(Pet) \sqsubseteq Affectionate$
- 0.7 :: $T(Fish) \sqsubseteq \neg Affectionate$
- 0.8 :: **T**(*Pet*) *⊆ Warm*
- 0.6 :: $T(Fish) \sqsubseteq Greyish$
- 0.9 :: $T(Fish) \sqsubseteq Scaly$
- 0.8 :: $T(Fish) \sqsubseteq \neg Warm$

Pet Fish - Inconsistent scenario

- 0.9 :: $T(Pet) \sqsubseteq \forall livesIn.(\neg Water)$
- 0.8 :: $T(Pet) \sqsubseteq Affectionate$
- 0.7 :: $T(Fish) \sqsubseteq \neg Affectionate$
- 0.8 :: **T**(*Pet*) *⊆ Warm*
- 0.6 :: $T(Fish) \sqsubseteq Greyish$
- 0.9 :: $T(Fish) \sqsubseteq Scaly$
- 0.8 :: $T(Fish) \sqsubseteq \neg Warm$
- Probability: -

(T^{CL}) at work: PET FISH

 Fish
 □ ∀livesIn.Water • 0.9 :: $T(Pet) \sqsubseteq \forall livesIn.(\neg Water)$ • 0.8 :: $T(Pet) \sqsubseteq Affectionate$ • 0.7 :: $T(Fish) \sqsubseteq \neg Affectionate$ • 0.8 :: $T(Pet) \sqsubseteq Warm$ • 0.6 :: $T(Fish) \sqsubseteq Greyish$ • 0.9 :: $T(Fish) \sqsubseteq Scaly$ • 0.8 :: $T(Fish) \sqsubseteq \neg Warm$ • Probability: $(1-0.9) \times (1-0.8) \times 0.7 \times \cdots \times 0.8 = 0.1\%$


Pet Fish - Trivial scenario

- Fish $\sqsubseteq \forall livesIn.Water$
- 0.9 :: $T(Pet) \sqsubseteq \forall livesIn.(\neg Water)$
- 0.8 :: $T(Pet) \sqsubseteq Affectionate$
- 0.7 :: $T(Fish) \sqsubseteq \neg Affectionate$
- 0.8 :: $T(Pet) \sqsubseteq Warm$
- 0.6 :: $\mathbf{T}(Fish) \sqsubseteq Greyish$
- 0.9 :: $T(Fish) \sqsubseteq Scaly$
- 0.8 :: $T(Fish) \sqsubseteq \neg Warm$
- Probability: $(1-0.9) \times (1-0.8) \times 0.7 \times \cdots \times 0.8 = 0.1\%$

Pet Fish - MODIFIER preferred to the HEAD


- 0.9 :: $T(Pet) \sqsubseteq \forall livesIn.(\neg Water)$
- 0.8 :: $T(Pet) \sqsubseteq Affectionate$
- 0.7 :: $T(Fish) \sqsubseteq \neg Affectionate$
- 0.8 :: $T(Pet) \sqsubseteq Warm$
- 0.6 :: $\mathbf{T}(Fish) \sqsubseteq Greyish$
- 0.9 :: $T(Fish) \sqsubseteq Scaly$
- 0.8 :: $T(Fish) \sqsubseteq \neg Warm$
- Probability: 0.05%

(TCL) at work - Pipeline



in T^{CL} we assume a hybrid KB (Rigid and Typical Roles)

Applications




Cognitive modelling

Linda problem; Lieto & Pozzato, **JETAI 20**)





- Computational Creativity
- Characters Generation



- Novel Genre Generation
- Recommender Systems (Chiodino et al, **ECAI 2020**)

with Centro Ricerche RAI

Goal oriented Knowledge Generation

Definition 1. Given a knowledge base **K** in the logic \mathbf{T}^{CL} , let **G** be a set of concepts {D1, D2, . . . , Dn} called goal.

We say that a concept C is a solution to the goal G if either:

- for all D_i ∈ G, either K |= C \sqsubseteq D or K0 |= T(C) \sqsubseteq D in the logic **T**^{CL}or:
- C corresponds to the combination of at least two concepts C1 and C2 occurring in K,
 i.e.

 $C = C1 \sqcap C2$, and the C-revised knowledge base Kc provided by the logic \mathbf{T}^{CL} is such that, for all $Di \in G$, either $Kc \models C \sqsubseteq D$ or $Kc \models T(C) \sqsubseteq D$ in \mathbf{T}^{CL}

Concept composition

We tested our system on a task of **concept composition** for a KB of **objects**.

 $G_1 = \{Object, Cutting, Graspable\},\$


GOALS

 $G_2 = \{Object, Graspable, LaunchingObjectsAtDistance\},\$ $G_3 = \{Object, Support, LiftingFromTheGround\},\$

KB TCL

vase, object $Vase \sqsubseteq Object$ vase, high convexity $Vase \sqsubseteq HighConvexity$ vase, ceramic, 0.8 $0.8 :: \mathbf{T}(Vase) \sqsubseteq Ceramic$ vase, to put plants, 0.9 $0.9 :: \mathbf{T}(Vase) \sqsubseteq ToPutPlants$ vase, to contain objects, 0.9 $0.9 :: \mathbf{T}(Vase) \sqsubseteq ToContainObjects$ vase, graspable, 0.9 $0.9 :: \mathbf{T}(Vase) \sqsubseteq Graspable$

G = {Object, Graspable, Launching objects at distance}



Evaluation (30 subjects)

	${\cal G}_1$	\mathcal{G}_2	\mathcal{G}_3
System	$Stone \sqcap Branch$	$Branch \sqcap RubberBand$	$Shelf \sqcap Stump$
Human	$Stone \sqcap Branch \ (KnifeWithHandle, 52\%)$	$Branch \sqcap RubberBand \ (Slingshot, 42\%)$	$Shelf \sqcap Stump \\ (Table, 59\%)$
System	-	$Book \sqcap RubberBand$	$Stump \sqcap SurfBoard$
Human	$Stone \sqcap Towel \ (13,3\%)$	$Towel \sqcap RubberBand \ (10,8\%)$	$egin{aligned} Vase &\sqcap Shelf \ (22,5\%) \end{aligned}$


Figure 1: Comparison on Concept Composition in a Domestic Domain.

```
G_1 = \{Object, Cutting, Graspable\},

G_2 = \{Object, Graspable, LaunchingObjectsAtDistance\},

G_3 = \{Object, Support, LiftingFromTheGround\},
```

SOAR Integration



Lieto et al. 2019, <u>Cognitive Systems Research</u>, **Beyond Subgoaling**, A dynamic knowledge generation framework for creative problem solving in cognitive architectures.

Minimal Cognitive Grid

"a **non subjective**, **graded**, evaluation framework allowing both **quantitative** and **qualitative** analysis about the **cognitive adequacy** and the **human-like performances** of artificial systems in both **single** and **multi-tasking** settings." (Lieto, 2021)

Functional/Structural Ratio

Generality

Performance match (including errors and psychometric measures)

Functionalist Models

TCL

Dual

Peccs

Upshots

- I have shown two different types of systems addressing, at different levels of representation, some crucial requirements of commonsense reasoning
- Such systems rely on the assumption that artificial cognitive agents should address different problems at the most convenient level and provide a way to foster the integration of such levels (non ad-hoc)
- A possibile integration can be obtained by relying on external linguistic resources like Wordnet (possibile extension also to visual tasks/modules)
- Functional and structural models of cognition have a different explanatory power (aspect to take into account when attributing cognitive faculties to a simulation)

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